Článek
And while for Ukraine’s pro-EU path this might be the event of the year, there are still some signs that individual member states, including most probably Hungary or Austria, which are trying to lobby for their own particular interests, might finally not support the key decision.
The result of the political vote on the accession talks might now look like a make-or-break moment from Kyiv. Yet, it does not really matter since the process of Ukrainian EU integration will not be reversed and is inevitable in the future. Much of the work in terms of preparation for the future enlargement and adopting of the EU’s acquis lies in front of the three countries in any case.
Already on the 8th of November, the European Commission recommended opening the accession talks with both Ukraine and Moldova as well as awarding the people of Georgia with candidacy status. This is what matters for the time being as it conveys the well-deserved recognition of each of the countries’ pro-reform and pro-European progress.
Even if it is a strategic and symbolical gesture to give the formal political green light for opening of the accession talks already now, it is clear that on the technical level, the countries of the Associated Trio will need more time to comply with the EU’s recommendations (conditionality), in order to meet the official criteria and open the formal procedure.
Hungarian stakes for Ukraine
On the one hand, Ukraine's political leadership has invested a lot of political capital into making sure that the society at war understands what lies ahead, sometimes painting an overly optimistic, even unrealistic picture of entering the Union within a few years time.
On the other hand, only thanks to the work of civil society and experts circles it gradually became clear to most that years of hard work lie ahead in order to be fully ready for EU membership. And for that it does not really matter what Hungary decides now since it is going to paralyse neither the EU’s support for Ukraine, nor the backing of the overwhelming majority of the EU members and international partners.
At this point, and despite the official proclamations of the Orban’s government, it is clear that Hungary is using the Ukraine card to lobby for its own interest, particularly in the area of financial aid and overcoming the conditionality, with which the rest of the EU are holding the government to account for breaking the EU’s norms and values and misusing the EU funds.
What should be understood in Ukraine is that beyond continuing the high-level dialogue with the government’s representatives and naming and shaming, there is very little that the rest of the Union can do to reverse the position of the Hungarian leadership. There are formal procedures to deprive the government of its voting rights, but they are quite politically costly and hard to achieve and put in place based on the tardy EU’s internal rules and procedures.
The most productive methods to deal with the blackmail has been so far to follow the transactionalist logic of trading with trouble makers and (way too often) exchange cash for policy decisions important for the EU-26, even if being risky in the longer run of normalising the practice.
Central and Eastern European standing
The current reality in Central and Eastern European countries might look like an attempt to make life for Ukraine more complicated, as seen on the recent examples of Poland, Slovakia or Hungary, but the picture is more complex than that.
The recent victory of the Polish opposition in the parliamentary elections brings good news for settling down on the bilateral tensions with Ukrainian counterparts, especially when it comes to the exports of agricultural products and transport but also more generally on the strategic level.
Poland together with Czechia will remain good friends and loyal allies that will strive to minimise the risks and problems caused by the other Visegrad Four countries, which Czechia is now trying to coordinate during its V4 presidency. This is in particular the case vis-a-vis Slovakia, whose new government started with some harsh rhetoric towards Ukraine, mostly meant for the domestic public.
What will be important to follow is the real policy stance and practical steps, which even the more complicated governments, including most notably the Slovak cabinet of Robert Fico, will follow, which speak for a high level of pragmatism and economic interests for their country.
The motto of «not a single bullet more» of the PM Robert Fico then fades away in context of the defence ministry following the existing contracts and allowing for commercial trade in military affairs in between Slovakia and Ukraine, which is the only possible after the storages of the Slovak Army have been depleted before during the previous government’s tenure.
The same then applies to the future Ukraine’s integration within the EU.
Despite some occasional harsh statements, the CEE EU members are unlikely to stand in the way of Ukraine’s path towards the EU, especially since it is going to bring substantial political and financial benefits when investing in cross-border ties and infrastructure.
Nevertheless, this should not prevent pro-active Ukraine’s diplomacy, more of outreach and presentation in each of the countries, which is necessary to sustain the good name of Ukraine and Ukrainians as well as their products, for example in the agricultural sector.
Only this way, the CEE societies will sustain their long-term support and remain good partners and match the positions of the governments, which are often more ambitious than their societies.
Pavel Havlicek is a Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs.
